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home  /  bedsores/ Plevna on the map Russian-Turkish war. The capture of Plevna by Russian troops: description, history and interesting facts

Plevna on the map of the Russo-Turkish war. The capture of Plevna by Russian troops: description, history and interesting facts

On February 24, 1878, exhausted by the winter campaign, but inspired by victories, the Russian troops occupied San Stefano and approached the suburbs of Istanbul - that is, to the very walls of Constantinople. The Russian army entered the direct road to the Turkish capital. There was no one to defend Istanbul - the best Turkish armies capitulated, one was blocked in the Danube region, and the army of Suleiman Pasha was defeated shortly before that south of the Balkan Mountains. Skobelev was appointed commander of the 4th Army Corps stationed in the vicinity of Adrianople. The army had a dream of capturing Constantinople, of returning the Byzantine capital to the bosom of Orthodox Church. This dream did not come true. But in that war, a Russian soldier won freedom for Orthodox Bulgaria, and also contributed to the independence of the Serbs, Montenegrins, and Romanians. We celebrate the victorious end of the war, as a result of which the Orthodox peoples got a chance for free development.


Nikolai Dmitrievich Dmitriev-Orenburgsky. General M.D. Skobelev on horseback. 1883

1877-1878 remained in the people's memory as one of the most glorious pages of the battle and political history. The feat of the heroes of Plevna and Shipka, the liberators of Sofia, is honored both in Russia and in Bulgaria. It was an impeccable liberation war - and the Balkans had been waiting for it for a long time, hoping for Russia, they understood that help could only come from St. Petersburg and Moscow.

The Balkans remember heroes. One of the main churches in Sofia is the Alexander Nevsky Cathedral, a symbol of liberation from the Ottoman yoke. It was erected in memory of Russian soldiers who fell in the battles for the liberation of Bulgaria. From 1878 to this day in Bulgaria during the liturgy in Orthodox churches, during the great entrance of the liturgy of the faithful, Alexander II and all Russian soldiers who fell in the war of liberation are commemorated. Bulgaria has not forgotten those battles!


Alexander Nevsky Cathedral in Sofia

In our time, the friendship between Russians and Bulgarians is being tested dangerously. There are many false and therefore deceived expectations in this story. Alas, our peoples suffer from an "inferiority complex", and the patriots have become painfully vulnerable - and therefore they always choose the path to disengagement, to insults and conflicts. Therefore, false legends are used - for example, that in the Great Patriotic War the Bulgarians fought against the Red Army. But the authorities of the then Bulgaria, being allies of Hitler, flatly refused to participate in hostilities against Russia. We understood that the Bulgarians would not shoot at the Russians...

Bulgaria is the only country among the allies of the Reich that did not fight with the USSR, despite the hysterical pressure of Hitler's diplomacy.

The anti-fascist underground in Bulgaria was born as soon as Germany attacked the USSR. And since 1944, the First Bulgarian Army fought the Nazis as part of the 3rd Ukrainian Front.

Today there are many professional truth-lovers-provocateurs, and they like to talk about the "ungratefulness" of the Slavic peoples, who often fought against Russia. Say, we don’t need such little brothers ... Rather than quarrel the peoples, looking for the slightest reason, it would be better to remember General Stoychev more often - the only foreign commander who participated in the Victory Parade in Moscow on June 24, 1945! Such an honor was not given for beautiful eyes. Popular wisdom is not mistaken: "They carry water on the offended." Collecting insults is for the weak.

Bulgaria is not a vassal of Russia, it did not swear allegiance to Russia. But it is difficult to find in Europe a people closer in culture to Russians.

Bulgarians know and respect Russia. To find mutual language we are always easy. Just don’t place your hopes on big politics, just as you shouldn’t believe in its propaganda accompaniment…

But - let's talk about the factors of victory in 1878. And about controversial points in the interpretation of that war.


Crossing the Russian army across the Danube at Zimnitsa June 15, 1877, Nikolai Dmitriev-Orenburgsky (1883)

1. Did Russia really fight unselfishly for the freedom of fraternal peoples?

It was, as you know, not the first Russian-Turkish war. Russia dealt several powerful blows to the Ottoman Empire. Settled in the Black Sea. In the Crimea, in the Caucasus.

But the officers dreamed of a liberation campaign in the Balkans, and the rulers of thoughts - priests, writers - called for help to the Orthodox peoples. This was the main thing.

Of course, it was also about the state prestige of Russia, which had to be restored after the unsuccessful Crimean War. Strategists and dreamers thought about the liberation of Constantinople and control over the straits. But, as is known, Russia refrained from such radical actions. London, Paris, Berlin would not allow the final destruction of the Ottoman Empire, and in St. Petersburg they understood this.

2. What was the reason for the war? Why did it start in 1877?

In 1876, the Turks brutally crushed the April Uprising in Bulgaria. The troops of the Bulgarian rebels were defeated, even old people and children were repressed ... Russian diplomacy failed to get concessions from Istanbul, and in April 1877, without enlisting the support of any significant allies except Austria-Hungary, Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire. fighting began in the Balkans and the Caucasus.

3. What does the expression "Everything is calm on Shipka" mean?

“Everything is calm on Shipka” is one of the most truthful paintings about the war, the creation of Vasily Vereshchagin. And at the same time it is famous words General Fyodor Radetsky, addressed to the commander in chief. He constantly repeated this report, no matter how difficult it was. It turned out that the death of soldiers is something taken for granted, which is not worth reporting about.

The artist was hostile towards Radetzky. Vereshchagin visited the Shipka Pass, painted soldiers from nature, painted snow trenches. It was then that the idea of ​​a triptych was born - a requiem for a simple soldier.

The first picture depicts a sentry brought up to his knees by a snowstorm, apparently forgotten by everyone, lonely. On the second - he still stands, although he is covered with snow up to his chest. The soldier did not flinch! The watch was not changed. The cold and blizzard turned out to be stronger than it, and in the third picture we see only a huge snowdrift in the place of the sentry, the only reminder of which is the corner of the overcoat, not yet covered with snow.

A simple plot makes a strong impression, makes you think about the informal side of the war. The grave of an unknown soldier, a Russian sentry, remained in the Shipka snows. Here is a bitter satire, and a monument to the courage of a Russian soldier, true to his duty, capable of miracles of stamina.

This picture is well known both in Russia and in Bulgaria. The memory of the famous and unknown heroes who fought in 1878 for the freedom of Bulgaria will not die. “Everything is calm on Shipka” - these words for us are both the definition of bragging and a symbol of reliability. From which side to look. And heroes remain heroes.


Vasily Vereshchagin. Everything is calm on Shipka. 1878, 1879

4. How did you manage to liberate the Bulgarian capital - Sofia?

The Bulgarian city was the main supply base for the Turkish army. And the Turks defended Sofia with fury. The battles for the city began on December 31, 1877 near the village of Gorni-Bogrov. Bulgarian volunteers fought alongside the Russians. Gurko's troops cut off the enemy's retreat to Plovdiv. The Turkish commander Nuri Pasha was terribly afraid of being surrounded and hastily retreated to the west, leaving 6 thousand wounded in the city ... He also gave the order to burn the city. The intervention of Italian diplomats saved the city from destruction.

On January 4, the Russian army entered Sofia. The centuries-old Turkish yoke was put to an end. Sophia blossomed on this winter day. The Bulgarians enthusiastically greeted the Russians, and General Gurko was crowned with the laurels of a victor.

The classic of Bulgarian literature Ivan Vazov wrote:

"Mother Mother! Vaughn, look…”
"What's in there?" - "I see guns, sabers ..."
"Russians! .." - "Yes, then they,
Let's go meet them closer.
It was God who sent them
To help us, son."
The boy forgot his toys
He ran to meet the soldiers.
Like the sun is happy:
"Hello brothers!"

5. How was the Russian army treated in Bulgaria?

The soldiers were greeted hospitably, as liberators, as brothers. The generals were greeted like kings. In addition, the Bulgarians fought shoulder to shoulder with the Russians, it was a true military brotherhood.

Before the start of the war, in a hurry, it was possible to form a Bulgarian militia - from among the refugees and residents of Bessarabia. General N.G. Stoletov commanded the militias. By the beginning of hostilities, he had 5,000 Bulgarians at his disposal. During the war, more and more patriots joined them. Flying partisan detachments operated behind enemy lines. The Bulgarians provided the Russian army with food and intelligence. The inscriptions on the monuments to Russian soldiers, of which there are hundreds in modern Bulgaria, also testify to the military brotherhood:

Bow to you, Russian army, which delivered us from Turkish slavery.
Bow, Bulgaria, to the graves with which you are littered.
Eternal glory to the Russian soldiers who fell for the liberation of Bulgaria.

Russia does not border on Bulgaria. But never did one people with such courage go to the rescue of another. And no nation has ever kept gratitude to another people for so many years - as a shrine.


Nizhny Novgorod dragoons chasing the Turks on the road to Kars

6. At what cost did you manage to break the resistance of the Ottomans in that war?

The war was fierce. More than 300,000 Russian soldiers took part in the fighting in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Textbook data on losses are as follows: 15,567 killed, 56,652 wounded, 6,824 died of wounds. There are also data that are twice our losses ... The Turks lost 30 thousand killed, another 90 thousand died from wounds and diseases.

The Russian army did not surpass the Turks in terms of weapons and equipment. But great was the superiority in the combat skills of the soldiers and in the level of military skill of the generals.

Another factor in the victory was the military reform developed by D.A. Milyutin. The Minister of War managed to rationalize the management of the army. And for the "Berdanka" of the 1870 model (Berdan's rifle), the army was grateful to him. The shortcomings of the reform had to be corrected during the campaign: for example, Skobelev guessed to replace the uncomfortable soldier's knapsacks with canvas bags, which made life easier for the army.

The Russian soldier had to wage an unusual mountain war. They fought in the most difficult conditions. If it were not for the iron character of our soldiers, they would not have survived either at Shipka or at Plevna.


Monument of Freedom at the Shipka Pass

7. Why did the Bulgarians end up in the camp of Russia's opponents in World War I?

What is this - deceit, treachery? Rather, it is a path of mutual errors. Relations between the two Orthodox kingdoms escalated during the Balkan Wars, in which Bulgaria fought for the laurels of the leading power in the region. Russia made attempts to restore influence in the Balkans, our diplomats invented various combinations. But - to no avail. In the end, Prime Minister Radoslavov in Russia began to be portrayed in evil caricatures.

The Balkans turned in those years into a tangle of contradictions, the main of which was the enmity between the two Orthodox peoples - Bulgarian and Serbian.

The study of the history of mutual and cross territorial claims of neighboring peoples is instructive. So Bulgaria entered the First World War by declaring war on Serbia. That is, on the side of the "Central Powers" and against the Entente. This was a great success for German diplomacy, reinforced by the loans that Berlin provided to Bulgaria.

The Bulgarians fought against the Serbs and Romanians, fought very successfully at first. In the end, they ended up on the losing side.

From the appeal of the Bulgarian Central Committee to the Bulgarian people

Brothers! The hordes of Turkish monsters drowned our protest in blood and carried out those unheard-of atrocities for which there is no justification, atrocities that shook the whole world. Our villages were burned: mothers, loved ones, children dishonored and slaughtered without pity; priests are crucified; the temples of God were defiled, and the fields were strewn with innocent bloody victims. For a whole year we carried the martyr's cross, but in the midst of indescribable oppression and suffering, hope gleamed, strengthening us. The hope that never left us for a moment was the great Orthodox Russia.

Brothers! It was not in vain that we waited for her powerful support, a year has passed, she comes and asks for an account for the blood of the martyrs.

Soon victorious Russian banners will dawn in our country, and under their shadow the beginnings of a better future will be laid.

The Russians are going disinterestedly, like brothers, to help, to do now the same thing that they did earlier to liberate the Greeks, Romanians, Serbs.

Bulgarians! We will all meet the liberator brothers as one and help the Russian army...

COURSE OF EVENTS

During the siege of Plevna, four battles were given: the first three were attacks on the tour. fortifications, the fourth - the last attempt by Osman Pasha to break through the battle formations of the besiegers. July 20, 1877 the vanguard of the corps of General. Schilder-Schuldner numbering 6500 people. attacked defensive fortifications north and east of Plevna; the Russians lost two-thirds of their officers and approx. 2000 soldiers. The second battle took place on July 30, when Gen. Kridener with two Russian divisions (30,000 people) attacked the tour. redoubts to the north and east of the city; gene. Shakhovskoy commanded the offensive. The attack on the Grivitsky redoubt (north of Plevna), which turned out to be completely unsuccessful, was led by Kridener himself; Shakhovskoy by 17.30 captured two redoubts located to the east of the fortress, but before dark they were again taken by the Turks, and the Russians retreated, suffering defeat along the entire front. Their losses amounted to 169 officers and 7136 soldiers, including 2400 left lying dead on the battlefield. 11 and 12 Sept. an army besieging the city of 95,000 people. under the command of Grand Duke Michael attacked Plevna from three sides. Osman Pasha at that time had under his command 34,000 people. 11 Sept. the attack on the Omerbey redoubt was repulsed, the Russian losses amounted to 6000 people. Skobelev captured two of the six internal redoubts that protected the corner of the fortress from the southwest. 12 Sept. an attack on the second Grivitsky redoubt was repelled, and after a fierce battle, two redoubts captured by Skobelev were again occupied by the Turks. As a result of a two-day battle, Russian losses amounted to 20,600 people, including 2,000 prisoners, from the tour. sides - 5000. 10 Dec. Osman Pasha, at the head of a 25,000-strong detachment, with 9,000 wounded and recovering in wagons, tried to break through the Russian army besieging the city, which by that time amounted to 100,000 people. (under the nominal leadership of the Roman prince Karol, chief of staff - General Totleben). Having successfully crossed the river Wit, Osman attacked the Russian troops on a two-mile front and captured the first line of field fortifications. However, Totleben hastily sent reinforcements there, and the Turks in their turn were attacked and thrown back in disorder across the river; Osman was seriously injured. Here the Turks last time they tried to gain a foothold, but were crushed and pushed back to Plevna; the city capitulated before the evening after 143 days of defense. In this battle, the Turks lost 5000, the Russians - 2000 killed and wounded. The Russian army continued its movement deep into the Balkan Peninsula.

SKOBELEV UNDER PLYEVNA

... He was exceptionally popular in Russian society. “Our Achilles,” I.S. said about him. Turgenev. The influence of Skobelev on the mass of soldiers could only be compared with the influence. The soldiers idolized him and believed in his invulnerability, since he, who spent his whole life in battles, was never wounded. The soldier's rumor "certified" that Skobelev knew the conspiracy word against death ("in Turkestan he bought from a Tatar for 10 thousand gold pieces"). Near Plevna, a wounded soldier told his comrades: “The bullet went through him (Skobeleva. - N.T.), nothing for him, but wounded me.”

N. Troitsky

IRREGULAR "HOORAY!"

At the end of November, the Turks left the fortress and tried to break through the Russian defense lines in one of the sections and join up with the main forces of their army. But they failed. With the reserves of Russian troops quickly approaching from other sectors, they were stopped, attacked and surrounded.

On command, the troops quickly moved apart, and as soon as the Turks rushed into the open space, forty-eight copper mouths threw fire and death into their continuous and crowded ranks ... Buckshot with an evil whistle burst into this living mass, leaving another mass along the way, but already either motionless, lifeless, or writhing in terrible agony ... Grenades fell and exploded - and there was nowhere to escape from them. As soon as the grenadiers noticed that the fire on the Turks had the proper effect ... they rushed at a quick step with a bang. Once more the bayonets crossed, once again the copper mouths of the guns roared, and soon the innumerable crowd of the enemy overturned into disorderly flight... The attack was brilliant. The retreating almost did not shoot back. Redif and Nizam, bashi-bouzouki and cavalrymen with Circassians - all this mixed up in one sea of ​​horses and lavas, irresistibly rushing back ...

At the head of his best camps, himself in front, Osman Pasha rushed to try to break through our lines for the last time. Each soldier following him fought for three... But everywhere... a wall of formidable bayonets grew in front of him, and an uncontrollable "Hurrah!" thundered right in the Pasha's face. Everything was lost. The duel was over... The army must lay down their arms, fifty thousand of the best combat troops will be deleted from Turkey's already significantly depleted resources ...

Nemirovich-Danchenko V. I. Year of the war. Diary of a Russian correspondent, 1877-1878, St. Petersburg, 1878

ALL RUSSIA JOYS

The battle on November 28 with Osman Pasha decided the fate of his army, which so staunchly resisted all the efforts of our weapons for almost 8 months. This army, with its worthy commander at the head, among 40 thousand, surrendered to us unconditionally ...

I am proud to command such troops and I must tell you that I cannot find words to adequately express my respect and admiration for your fighting prowess.

Bearing with full consciousness of sacred duty all the difficulties of the blockade service near Plevna, you completed it with a battle on November 28, like real heroes. Remember that I am not alone, but all of Russia, all her sons rejoice and rejoice at your glorious victory over Osman Pasha ...

Commander of the Grenadier Corps, Lieutenant General P.S. Ganetsky

A. Kivshenko. Surrender of Plevna (Wounded Osman Pasha before Alexander II). 1880. (Fragment)

RUSSIAN WINNERS

Emperor Alexander, who was in Tuchenitsa, having learned about the fall of Plevna, immediately went to the troops, congratulated them ... Osman Pasha, the "Plevna lion", was received by the sovereign and his senior commanders with distinction and delicacy. The emperor said a few flattering words to him and returned the saber. Russian officers rendered the captured marshal high reverence at every opportunity.

On December 11, the Russians entered the conquered city, surrounded on all sides by mountains, lying completely in a hollow, opening only to the west ... The sanitary situation of the city was simply terrifying. Hospitals, mosques and other buildings were overflowing with corpses, dying sick and wounded. These unfortunates were left without help and charity; it required great energy and dedication to separate the living from the dead and establish even the slightest bit of some kind of order.

On December 15, the emperor left the theater of operations, returning to St. Petersburg, where he was received with indescribable enthusiasm.

MONUMENT TO THE HEROES OF PLEVNA

From an appeal to the troops about the opening of a voluntary subscription to the monument to the heroes of Plevna

Serving as a tribute of deep respect to the memory of those who fell in this battle, the erected monument will serve to maintain high military feelings in future descendants: valor, courage and courage, and for the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula - a reminder that they owe their freedom, new life to the Christian generosity of the Russian people, who redeemed their release by the blood of faithful sons.

After three unsuccessful assaults Plevna, its siege began. Under Plevna, the sovereign summoned an engineer-generalTotleben E.I., on September 15 (27) he arrived in the army. “There will be no fourth assault on Plevna,” said Eduard Ivanovich. Totleben was a recognized authority in the conduct of a serf war, he was supposed to develop a plan for the siege of Plevna.

Russian soldiers were ordered to vigorously dig in. For the complete encirclement of Plevna, it was necessary to capture fortified points Mountain Dubnyak, Dolny Dubnyak and Telish; block the Sofia-Plevna road in order to tightly lock Osman Pasha in the city.

Totleben E.I. ordered General Gurko I.V. seize the Sofia Highway and occupy all the space on the left bank of the Vid River. On the same day, he ordered General Zotov to occupy the Lovchinskoe highway, to fortify south of Brestovets on the Red Hill, and to other units to arrange a demonstration in the direction of Plevna. And all the other troops of the Western Detachment were ordered to demonstrate that day. Totleben and his staff worked tirelessly, sending orders to the troops and developed dispositions for each unit separately.

Attack by the troops of General Gurko Mountain Dubnyak was carried out successfully, but cost four and a half thousand disabled Russian soldiers and officers. Of course, too high a price ... Totleben and many military leaders again started talking about the need for more thoughtful army actions, the need for careful artillery preparation for an attack, about reconnaissance, finally, as an obligatory prerequisite for an attack. Had to take two more settlements standing on the Sofia highway.

Gurko developed a disposition for mastering Telish mainly by artillery fire. Totleben gave the following order to Gurko’s detachment on this report: “I fully share the considerations of Your Excellency, set out in report No. 28 on October 13, regarding the need to capture Telish and at the same time mainly an artillery attack, avoiding an assault if possible ...” In addition, Totleben also ordered the actions other units entrusted to him in order to strengthen the connection between all parts. Totleben attached particular importance to the actions of the 16th division of Skobelev M.D. as the most reliable in all respects.

The sad experience of taking Gorny Dubnyak was too expensive to repeat it: twenty-five thousand selected troops, with the most heroic courage, with the able leadership of the talented General Gurko, were barely able to capture two weak Turkish redoubts, which were defended by small detachments of the Turks. Why resort to such a method of capturing fortresses when there is an excellent way - to starve and force to surrender.

Chief of Staff of the Gurko detachment General Naglovsky on the eve of the attack Telisha reported in a report to the command that during the capture of Telish it was planned to fire 100 shells per gun, a total of 7200 shells. Approaching the position, the infantry and batteries must dig in. Alexander II, the commander in chief, a large retinue surveyed Plevna and the Turkish position from the lunette of the Kaluga regiment.

The artillery attack of Telish began, the batteries fired volley after volley, but the Turks almost did not answer them, hiding from the fire in dugouts. But the concentrated volleys of several batteries, directed first at one, then at the other Turkish redoubts, made a strong moral impression on the enemy, and the losses were sensitive, of the order 50-60 people per day.

At 12 o'clock, in accordance with the disposition developed by Totleben and Gurko, Skobelev made a demonstration along Zelenaya Gora towards the Krishinsky Heights. But soon he retreated, and silence fell on all the lines, only from the direction of Telish came the muffled cannonade, which had lasted for two hours.

At four o'clock on October 16, Totleben received a report that Telish had been taken, the garrison completely capitulated along with Izmail-Khaki Pasha and 100 officers. Our losses were the smallest. It remained only to take Dolny Dubnyak in order to complete the complete taxation of Plevna. And now Osman Pasha is so surrounded that any attempt to break through from Plevna or to Plevna is doomed to failure: everywhere he will be met by fortified positions with Russian troops. The breakthrough will cost him dearly if he dares to make it.

Two guard divisions General Gurko I.V. knocked out the Turks and from the redoubt Dolny Dubnyak, forcing them to retreat to Plevna. After that, Plevna was completely blocked.

Thus began the planned siege of Plevna. Osman Pasha was surrounded. His army was left to its own devices by the military council in Constantinople.

By the end of November 1877, the besieged units found themselves in a critical situation: food supplies were exhausted, epidemics raged, soldiers deserted. The Bulgarians increasingly crossed the front line and obtained important information. On December 9, 1877, a Bulgarian came to the headquarters of the Russian army and said: “The last supplies have been distributed. The Turkish population on carts leaves the city, heading towards the Vit River.

Near Pleven there was a "horseshoe" of enemy defensive structures. This "horseshoe" had six defense sectors (sectors). Total length enemy position reached 40 kilometers. It began north of the villages of Opanets, Bukovlyk and the Tuchenitsa River, then turned south along the Tuchenitskaya Hollow, Uchin-Dol, the Zelenite-Gori and Kyshin areas and ended in the west by the banks of the Vit River.

The position on the sixth sector of the siege, on the left bank of the river Vit, was occupied by the grenadier corps; the first brigade of the 5th Infantry Division with two batteries; the 4th Romanian division with all its artillery; 9th Kazan Dragoon; 9th Bug Lancers; 9th Kyiv Hussars and 4th Don Regiments, as well as the 7th Horse Artillery Battery; 2nd Don battery and a regiment of Romanian cavalry.

Early in the morning of December 10, 1877, in the sixth sector, the besiegers were unexpectedly attacked by the Turks, led by Osman Pasha. The Russian outposts retreated. A signal tower soared high into the sky, and drums sounded the alarm throughout the Russian rear positions. Half an hour later the Turks appeared in front of the Russian trenches. With exclamations of "Allah" they rushed to the attack. They were met by the grenadiers of the Siberian regiment. A fierce hand-to-hand fight ensued. The Russian soldiers did not retreat. Having mastered the trenches of the first line, the Turks rushed to the battery of the 3rd grenadier artillery brigade.

Guard Osman Pasha reached the second line of Russian trenches. But here she stumbled upon reinforcements that had come to the aid of the Siberians, at the Little Russian Grenadier Regiment, which immediately rushed into a swift bayonet attack.

The Turkish units sought to break through to the north, to the Danube. The 9th Cavalry Division prepared for battle in case the enemy managed to break through. On the left flank, the Turkish arrows were met Arkhangelsk and Vologda regiments. The Turks again concentrated in the center of the Russian defense. It was there that the Russian reserves were sent.

Russian and Romanian artillery carried out powerful artillery preparation. Then the infantry went over to a decisive attack. At this moment, Osman Pasha was wounded. There was a rumor that he had been killed. The ranks of the enemy trembled. To the sound of the drum, the grenadiers went on the general offensive. In hand-to-hand combat, Private Yegor Zhdanov knocked down the Turkish standard-bearer to the ground, taking away the regimental banner from him.

The Turks rolled back to the Vit River. A traffic jam arose on the bridge, wagons and people fell into the water ... After a while, the enemy raised a white flag. Acting Chief of Staff of the Turkish Army in Plevna Tefik Pasha began negotiations, saying that Osman Pasha was wounded and could not come.

The Turks agreed to unconditional surrender. Surrendered into captivity 10 Turkish generals, 2 thousand. officers and 30 thousand soldiers. The victors captured rich trophies: artillery, ammunition, carts. So inglorious for the Ottoman army ended last Stand near Plevna, which was destined to become a city of Russian military glory.

140 years ago, on September 11-12, 1877, the third assault on Plevna took place. In the course of a stubborn and bloody battle, the Russian-Romanian troops achieved some success. The breakthrough of the Skobelev detachment on September 11 in the southern direction could decide the outcome of the battle in favor of the Russian army. But the Russian high command refused to regroup forces to the south and did not support Skobelev's detachment with reserves. As a result, the Turks counterattacked the next day and drove our troops back. The third assault on the Turkish fortress ended in the defeat of the allies.

Storm preparation


Simultaneously with the organization of the attack on Lovcha, the Russian high command was preparing a new assault on Plevna. They planned to throw the Russian-Romanian Western Detachment against the Turkish stronghold: 52.1 thousand Russians and 316 guns, 32 thousand Romanians and 108 guns. In total - 84.1 thousand people 424 guns. The army of the Turkish commander Osman Pasha consisted of 32 thousand people and 70 guns. The Allies had a great superiority in manpower and artillery. However, the task was very difficult. The Turks turned Plevna into a strong fortified area, consisting of a system of redoubts and trenches. The approaches to the fortifications were shot through. The most powerful fortifications were in the northeast and south.

The unsuccessful experience of the first two assaults on Plevna showed that it was impossible to take the fortress without first destroying the enemy defenses. Therefore, it was decided to subject the enemy positions to heavy bombardment and only then go on the assault. Artillery was tasked with destroying enemy fortifications, suppressing Turkish artillery, and demoralizing the garrison. The general idea of ​​​​using artillery was outlined as follows: “Set up strong artillery, including 20 siege guns, and make preliminary infantry attacks, prolonged shelling of enemy fortifications, while at the same time gradually approaching the enemy infantry position, supporting it by advancing at close range masses of field artillery and, having finally defeated the enemy fortifications and artillery with a mass of our artillery shells, then attack with infantry. However, it was impossible to solve this problem, since there were no large-caliber guns and ammunition for them to destroy the Turkish fortifications. But the Russian command did not take this circumstance into account. Thus, serious mistakes were made already at the planning stage.

At 6 o'clock on August 26 (September 7), 1877, artillery preparation began. It lasted four days, until August 29 (September 10). On the right flank, 36 Romanian and 46 Russian guns participated in it. In the center - 48 Russian guns. There was no preparation on the left flank. The fire was directed at the most important fortifications of Plevna, but it was not effective enough. Artillery was unable to destroy the redoubts and trenches and upset the enemy defense system. At night they approached the Turkish fortifications and the next day they continued shelling enemy positions. Again, no tangible results were achieved. During the shelling, the Turks left the fortifications for shelters or to the rear, and at night they returned and corrected all the damage.

On August 27 (September 8), Romanian troops captured the enemy's advanced trench near the Grivitsky redoubt. Great importance had an advance of Russian troops on the left flank, where two ridges were occupied Green mountains on the southern approaches to Plevna. A detachment of cavalry under the command of General Loshkarev advanced to the fortified camp from the west. Attempts by Turkish troops to push the enemy back into starting position did not reach the goal.

On August 28 (September 9), artillery preparation continued. Prolonged shelling of the fortress led to a large consumption of ammunition. “Although our batteries have moved forward,” wrote D. A. Milyutin, “and they are generally successful, however positive result not yet noticeable, but meanwhile the chief of artillery, Prince Masalsky, is already complaining about the immoderate expenditure of charges and the difficulty of their timely replenishment. Flying and mobile parks barely have time to deliver. General Zotov instructed not to rush to start the assault on the enemy’s fortified area, but “to patiently let artillery do its job of destroying barriers, moral exhaustion and material disorganization of the defender.” It was decided to continue to bring the batteries closer to enemy positions, where the terrain allows, and to continue artillery preparation for some more time. However, four days of intensive artillery preparation did not give serious results. Nevertheless, at the military council on August 29 (September 10), it was decided to start the assault the next day.

Thus, on August 26 (September 7) - August 29 (September 10), Russian and Romanian guns fired on Turkish fortifications. Despite the duration of artillery preparation and a large number of fired shells, the Turkish garrison failed to inflict tangible losses, the damage to the fortifications of Plevna was also insignificant, the Turks easily restored the damaged buildings in the intervals between shelling their positions.

By this time, the allied forces were covering Plevna from the north, east and south. The right wing was made up of Romanian troops, having the 3rd and 4th infantry divisions on the heights north and northeast of Grivitsa, and the 2nd division in reserve. In the center, between Grivitsa and Radishevo, was the 9th Corps, and between Radishevo and Tuchenitsky Creek - the 4th Corps. The left wing consisted of a detachment of Prince Imeretinsky, who occupied the area between the Tuchenitsky stream and the village of Krishin. The general reserve of the Western Detachment was located behind the 4th Corps south of Radishevo.

Romanian troops with part of the forces of the 9th Army Corps (1st Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division) were to attack from the northeast, in order to capture the Grivitsky redoubts. The troops of the 4th corps received the task of advancing on Plevna from the southeast, directing the main efforts to seize the Omar-bey-tabiya redoubt. The detachment of General M. D. Skobelev, allocated from the troops of Prince Imeretinsky, was supposed to attack the enemy from the south. The beginning of the assault was scheduled for 15 hours. The following tasks were assigned to the artillery: “At dawn, from all batteries, open the most intensified fire on enemy fortifications and continue it until 9 o'clock in the morning. At 9 o'clock at the same time and suddenly stop all firing at the enemy. At 11 o'clock in the afternoon, intensified artillery fire was opened again and continued until one o'clock in the afternoon. From an hour to 2.5 hours, again stop on all batteries, and at 2.5 hours again start an enhanced cannonade, stopping it only on those batteries, the operation of which can be prevented by the advancing troops.

The disadvantage of the operation plan was that the disposition was sent out only a few hours before the start of the assault, and the troops did not have enough time to carefully organize the attack. The direction of the main attack was also incorrectly chosen (as in previous assaults). The Allies planned to storm Plevna from the three most fortified sides. The opportunity was not used to carry out a roundabout maneuver, to attack the Turkish garrison from the western direction, where the Turks had almost no fortifications. The day of the third assault was also unsuccessfully chosen - because of weather conditions. All night and half a day on August 30 (September 11), 1877, it rained, then it was replaced by a drizzle. The soil was soaked, which prevented the movement of artillery and troops, visibility was poor. The assault had to be postponed. But it was the day of the royal name day, and no one dared to make such an offer. In his memoirs, the former chairman of the committee of ministers, P. A. Valuev, wrote that "if not for the 30s, we would not have stormed Plevny."

Storm

At 6 o'clock on August 30 (September 11), 1877, artillery preparation began. Thick fog covered the battlefield and interfered with the gunners. As a result, a good plan for the use of artillery that day could not be fully implemented. Artillery was unable to fully support the advancing infantry.

On the right flank at 15 o'clock, the Romanian troops launched an attack on two Grivitsky redoubts, which were located at a distance of about 400 meters from each other. Suffering heavy losses from rifle and artillery fire, the Romanians attacked the fortifications three times, but were not successful. The unfired Romanian soldiers, having met stubborn resistance from the enemy, were confused. Then the 1st brigade of the 5th infantry division under the command of Lieutenant General M.V. Rodionov was put forward to help them. The Romanians, with the arrival of the Russians, perked up and again went into battle. The Russian-Romanian troops went on the fourth attack and, at the cost of heavy losses, captured the Grivitsky redoubt No. 1. The Turks tried to recapture the redoubt, but they were thrown back. The Allies could not advance further. The Turks took measures to strengthen the defense in this direction. “The Grivitsky redoubt remained with us,” wrote D. A. Milyutin, “but the Turks managed to build new fortifications against it, while ours, having sat in the redoubt, did nothing all day to firmly establish itself in it, and did not even import artillery in it.

In the central sector, due to a mistake, the attack began not at 15 o'clock, as was the plan of the operation, but around noon. Russian troops came under heavy fire from the Omar redoubt. The Russian command consistently threw regiment after regiment into battle, but without success. Russian troops suffered heavy losses - about 4.5 thousand people. As a result, the Russian regiments went on the attack at different times, entered the battle in parts, and acted frontally. Such attacks were easily repelled by the enemy. The infantry offensive itself was poorly prepared by artillery. The strongest Turkish fortification in this direction - the Omar redoubt was not destroyed.

The battle on the Romanian part of the redoubt at c. Grivitsa. G. Dembitsky

The Russian troops achieved the greatest success on the left wing, where Skobelev's detachment operated. Here the enemy occupied positions that the chief of staff of the Western Detachment and its de facto leader, General P. D. Zotov, considered Plevna's "strategic and tactical key". They stretched from the southwest to the northeast, from a group of redoubts near the village of Krishin to the redoubts of Kavanlyk and Isa-Aga. Ahead of this position, Turkish troops occupied the third ridge of the Green Mountains. Skobelev considered the capture of the Kavanlyk and Isa-Aga redoubts (they were later called Skobelevsky) to be the main task. At dawn, artillery preparation began, and at 10 o'clock our troops went on the offensive and knocked the enemy down from the third ridge of the Green Mountains. The Turks retreated.

General Skobelev began to carry out main task- the assault on the two main Turkish fortifications in this direction. True, the nature of the terrain did not favor the success of the Russian troops. In order to get to the redoubts, the advancing troops had to descend along the gentle northern slope of the third ridge into a hollow in which the Zelenogorsk stream flowed in steep, inaccessible banks for artillery. There was only one bridge across the stream. Having crossed the stream, it was necessary to climb a steep slope to a height where strong enemy fortifications No. 1 (Kavanlyk) and No. 2 (Isa-Aga) were located, which were connected by a deep trench. Ahead of the redoubts, on the slope, were located rifle trenches.

At about 3 p.m., Skobelev's troops stormed the enemy fortifications. The Vladimir and Suzdal regiments advancing in the first echelon suffered heavy losses from enemy fire, and lay down near the Zelenogorsk stream. Skobelev threw into the attack the second echelon - the Revel regiment. Our troops attacked again, but this offensive was stopped by the strong fire of the Turkish army. Skobelev threw his last, third echelon into the attack - the Libau regiment and two rifle battalions. And he led the attack. Our troops reached the enemy, hand-to-hand combat began. At 16:30, Russian troops took the Kavanlyk redoubt, after a stubborn battle, at 18:00, the Isa-Aga redoubt was occupied. Turkish troops, having received reinforcements from the reserve, made several attempts to dislodge the enemy, but to no avail. Shooting continued throughout the night.

In fact, Skobelev's detachment opened the way to Plevna itself. There were no longer any Turkish fortifications in front of the troops of the detachment and the city. A situation was created in which the further development of the offensive gave the entire city into the hands of the Russians. Panic began in the ranks of the Turkish army, the enemy soldiers were tired of a fierce battle. However, Skobelev's detachment also needed serious reinforcements. The soldiers fought in the morning, were tired, many had not slept for 2-4 days. The detachment lost a lot of people, the troops had to be reduced to combined teams with random commanders at the head. There were mountains of corpses everywhere. There was a groan of the wounded, who had no one to take away. Ammunition was running out. All reserves have been used. The soldiers could not even dig in, since there was no trench tool, but, “despite fatigue, hunger, fatigue in battle, the soldiers felt the need to dig in and did not spare the rest of their strength for this. They dug or, rather, dug the ground with bayonets, cleavers, scraped with manners, raked out with their hands, just to somehow cover themselves from fire from three sides ”(Kuropatkin. Actions of General Skobelev’s detachments in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1-878, part .I.). For the construction of barriers, even the corpses of their own and Turkish soldiers were used.

Further development events depended on who would more accurately assess the situation and send reserves to this area. Skobelev promptly demanded that reinforcements be sent, but this was categorically refused to him. Neither the commander-in-chief nor Nepokoichitsky agreed to expose the Bolgarenskoe highway, did not believe that the Turks would dare to expose other directions in order to push back Skobelev's detachment. The Russian high command had the opportunity to regroup forces to the south and take the city itself. But the Russian command refused to regroup forces to the south and did not support the Skobelev detachment with reserves, believing that the assault had failed and there was no point in supporting the success of the Russian general. Although it was still possible to correct the mistakes of the attack plan and the failure of the troops of the right flank and center by introducing fresh reserves on the Russian left flank, achieving a decisive victory, albeit at an unnecessarily high price. Thus, the Russian command did not understand the benefits of the current situation, created in connection with the breakthrough of the flank of the Turkish defense and Skobelev's exit to Plevna itself, did not use the real opportunity to win a decisive victory. The breakthrough of fresh Russian troops into Plevna itself decided the outcome of the battle for the entire fortified area. So, the Russian command itself refused a sure chance of victory.

On August 31 (September 12), 1877, there was no active hostilities on the right flank and in the center. The Turks made one attack on the Grivitsky redoubt No. 1, but it was repulsed. The Turkish commander-in-chief Osman Pasha, unlike the Russian command, correctly assessed the situation and, given the great danger from the Skobelev detachment, which occupied two major fortifications Turkish army near Plevna itself, decided to throw large forces against him. Osman Pasha almost widow strengthened his right flank, transferring 15 fresh battalions to this direction, taken from various defense sectors and from the general reserve of the Plevna garrison. The inaction of the main forces of the Russian-Romanian army in other directions contributed to the fulfillment of the plan of the Turkish commander. At the same time, Skobelev’s detachment was not even supported by strong reinforcements, so that he would keep these fortifications in the hands of the Russian army, which would help in the future offensive. Krylov, who temporarily commanded the 4th Corps, sent to the redoubts only the Shuisky regiment, exhausted by the battle of September 11 and weak (1300 people). In addition, the regiment was late, it had to be used only to cover the retreat of Skobelev's detachment. Together with Shuisky, Krylov sent the Yaroslavl regiment, but Zotov took him to his general reserve.

On the morning of August 31 (September 12), the Turks launched a decisive counteroffensive against the Skobelev redoubts. Our troops repelled four Turkish attacks. Then the Turkish commander ordered the fifth attack to withdraw all reserves, reducing the composition of the garrisons in the trenches and redoubts in all other positions to the extreme. To inspire the counterattacking units, it was ordered to carry a green banner in front of them, and the mullahs in the camps to sing prayers. Behind the attacking troops, Osman Pasha placed a battery and two cavalry regiments, ordering them to shoot at anyone who decides to retreat.

Meanwhile, after repulsing the fourth Turkish attack the position of the troops of the Russian left wing became hopeless. Skobelev in his report described the state of the redoubts as follows: “The redoubts presented by this time (3.5 o'clock in the afternoon) a terrible picture. The mass of corpses of Russians and Turks lay in heaps. The interior of the redoubt was especially filled with them. In the deep trench that connected the redoubts, longitudinal shots of the enemy were laid down by dozens of people at once, and the piles of corpses that filled the trench alternated with the still living defenders. On redoubt No. 2, a part of the parapet facing the city of Plevna was made of corpses. On redoubt No. 1, three guns of the 5th battery of the 3rd artillery brigade were partly mangled and deprived of servants and horses. The remaining two guns of the 2nd artillery brigade, which also lost their servants, I ordered to be taken away earlier. The gun in the redoubt was also knocked out. I took out the rings from the gun in case they fell into the hands of the Turks. The position of the Russians in the rear of the redoubts was also difficult. Kuropatkin wrote about it this way: “The section of the position between the third ridge and the redoubts presented a picture that was also painful: thousands of wounded and corpses lay on this site. Hundreds of bodies ... lying mixed with Turkish corpses decomposed and polluted the air.

The last fifth attack at 4 p.m. was led by the Turkish commander Osman Pasha himself. During the defense of the Kavanlyk redoubt, its commandant, Major F. Gortalov, heroically died. However, despite the heroism and steadfastness of the Russian soldiers, the Turkish army was able to recapture the redoubts. Russian troops retreated in an organized manner, carrying away the wounded.


General M. D. Skobelev on horseback. N. D. Dmitriev-Orenburgsky

Results

Thus, the third assault on Plevna, despite the high military prowess, dedication and stamina of Russian and Romanian soldiers and officers, ended in failure. Allied troops suffered serious losses. 13 thousand Russians and 3 thousand Romanians were killed. Particularly serious losses were on the left wing: the troops lost 6.5 thousand people killed and wounded, which accounted for 44% of the officers and 41% of the soldiers and non-commissioned officers of the Skobelev and Imeretinsky troops. The Turks determined their losses at 3 thousand people. Apparently it was underestimated.

The failure of the third assault was caused by a number of reasons, based on the mistakes of the Russian high command. Many mistakes were “inherited” from the first and second assaults on Plevna, that is, they did not bother to work on the mistakes. Among the reasons for the failure of the assault: poor intelligence of the location of the Turkish army and its defense system; underestimation of the forces and means of the enemy; a template offensive in the same directions on the most fortified sections of the Turkish fortified area; the lack of maneuver by troops to attack Plevna from the west, where the Turks had almost no fortifications; refusal to transfer the main efforts to more promising direction, where Skobelev's detachment successfully broke through; the lack of interaction between the groupings of troops advancing on different directions(when some troops advanced, others stood) and clear control of all allied forces. In addition, they could not organize a full-fledged artillery preparation with the involvement of large-caliber guns - the Turkish fortifications were almost not damaged during the shelling, the Turks quickly restored them. Poorly chosen day for the attack.

As the historian N. I. Belyaev noted: “Third Plevna clearly showed that during the 2.5 months of the war the Russian high command did not learn anything, did not take into account any of its previous mistakes and managed to add new ones to the old mistakes. Ultimately, it must be admitted that the third assault on Plevna was not based on real calculation, but was built only on the basis of one valor of a Russian soldier, on the unexpected appearance of favorable accidents, on a “maybe” ”(N. I. Belyaev. Russian-Turkish war 1877-1878).

The lack of a unified command played a negative role. Formally, the Western detachment was headed by the Romanian prince Karl, in fact, the head of the troops was the chief of staff of the detachment, General Zotov. The Romanian troops were run by their general Cernata. Near Plevna were the Russian Emperor Alexander II, the Minister of War D. A. Milyutin, the Commander-in-Chief of the Danube Army, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich. Everything did not allow for clear control of the allied forces.

The unsuccessful outcome of the third assault on Plevna forced the Russian high command to change the way it dealt with the enemy. On September 1 (13), Tsar Alexander II arrived near Plevna and convened a military council, at which he raised the question of whether the army should remain near Plevna or whether it was necessary to retreat across the Osma River. The chief of staff of the Western Detachment, Lieutenant General P. D. Zotov, and the chief of artillery of the army, Lieutenant General Prince N. F. Masalsky, spoke out in favor of the retreat. For the continuation of the struggle for the fortress, Major General K. V. Levitsky, Assistant Chief of Staff of the Danube Army, and Minister of War D. A. Milyutin advocated.

The situation was not as dangerous as some generals saw it. Allied Russian-Romanian troops in the Balkans numbered 277 thousand people. Ottoman Empire had an army of 350 thousand, but only about 200 thousand people could put up against the allies. The main grouping of the Russian army, which consisted of more than 100 thousand people with 470 guns, was located near Kalafat, Lovcha and Plevna. The enemy countered these troops with 70,000 soldiers and 110 guns stationed in the area of ​​Vidin, Orkhaniye and Plevna. Therefore, Milyutin insisted on continuing operations in the Plevna area. At the same time, he proposed a new way to deal with the enemy. In his opinion, it was necessary to abandon direct assaults on Plevna and break the enemy's resistance with the help of a blockade. Milyutin correctly noted that the army in the field, without large-caliber artillery of mounted fire, would not be able to reliably suppress and destroy enemy fortifications, therefore, victory in a frontal assault was unlikely. In the event of a complete siege, however, a quick success can be achieved, since the Turkish army does not have reserves for waging a long-term struggle. Indeed, the enemy was already in a bad position. On September 2 (14), 1877, Osman Pasha reported to the high command that shells and food were running out, there were no reinforcements, and the losses had greatly weakened the garrison. The Turkish commander noted that the army was placed "in the need to retreat, but it is very difficult to carry out the retreat."

As a result, Alexander II supported Milyutin's point of view. Changes were made in the leadership of the Western Detachment. Engineer-General E. I. Totleben, summoned from St. Petersburg, was appointed assistant to the commander of the detachment of the Romanian prince Karl. He was a hero of the Crimean War of 1853-1856. General Zotov returned to command of the 4th Corps. The entire cavalry was subordinated to the brave and decisive I.V. Gurko. These changes have improved troop management. In addition, the newly arrived Guards Corps joined the Western Detachment: the 1st, 2nd, 3rd Guards Infantry and 2nd Guards Cavalry Divisions, and the Guards Rifle Brigade. The correct siege of Plevna began, which eventually led to victory.

November 28 ( old style) In 1877, Plevna (Pleven) was taken by Russian troops. It took four long months of siege and four assaults to capture the Ottoman stronghold, which chained the main forces of the Russian army to itself and slowed down its advance in the Balkans. “Plevna - this name has become the subject of general attention. The fall of Plevna was an event, the onset of which everyone expected with intense attention from day to day ... The fall of Plevna decided the whole issue of the war ", - one of the capital's newspapers of that time wrote about the significance of Plevna. “In almost every war, events often occur that have a decisive influence on all subsequent operations. Such a decisive event was undoubtedly the battle of Plevna on November 28, 1877 ... "- Major General of the General Staff A.I. Manykin-Nevstruev stated in turn.

Plevna was at the crossroads leading to Ruschuk, Sofia and Lovcha. Wanting to stop the advance of the Russian troops, the Turkish mushir (marshal) Osman Pasha, having made a swift throw with his troops, occupied Plevna, ahead of the Russians. When our troops approached the city, the Turks erecting defensive fortifications appeared before their eyes. The first assault on Turkish positions, undertaken on July 8, 1877, did not bring success - having overcome three lines of trenches, Russian soldiers broke into the city, but were driven out by the Turks.

Having received reinforcements that ensured numerical superiority over the Turkish garrison, the Russian army launched a second assault on July 30, which also did not bring the expected result: having captured two trenches and three fortifications with huge losses, our troops were stopped at the redoubt, and then driven out by the Turkish counteroffensive. “This Second Plevna almost turned into a disaster for the entire army, - noted the military historian A.A. Kersnovsky . - The defeat of the IX Corps was complete, the entire rear of the army was seized by panic, under the influence of which they almost destroyed the only bridge crossing near Sistov. We had 32,000 fighters near Plevia with 176 guns. The Turks had 26,000 and 50 guns. (...) Our losses: 1 general, 168 officers, 7167 lower ranks. The only trophies are 2 guns. The Turks were out of action 1200 people. (...) Grand Duke the commander-in-chief completely lost his head and turned for help to the Romanian king Charles in expressions that did not correspond to either the dignity of Russia or the honor of the Russian army ".

In order to cut off Plevna and prevent the Turks from receiving provisions without hindrance, the Russian command decided to attack Lovcha, occupied by a small Turkish garrison. The detachment of General M.D. Skobelev brilliantly coped with this task, taking Lovcha by August 22.

In the meantime, intensive preparations were underway for the third assault on Plevna, under which all free Russian forces were pulled together. On August 25, a council of war was held, at which most of the military leaders spoke in favor of an immediate assault, so as not to drag out the siege until winter. The Commander-in-Chief of the entire Danube Army, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, who agreed with this argument, appointed August 30 as the day of the assault - the day of the Sovereign's namesake. “And the assault on August 30 became the Third Plevna for Russia! It was the bloodiest thing in all the wars that the Russians ever waged with the Turks. The heroism and self-sacrifice of the troops did not help, the desperate energy of Skobelev, who personally led them on the attack, did not help ... The "Keys of Plevna" - the redoubts of Abdul-bey and Reggie Bey - were taken, but General Zotov, who was in charge of all the troops, refused to support Skobelev, preferring to give up victory rather than weaken the "barriers" and "reserves". With his last effort, Osman (who had decided to abandon Plevna) snatched victory from a handful of Gortalov's heroes, who were bleeding in the sight of Zot's "reserves" standing with a gun at their feet "- wrote A.A. Kersnovsky.

The “White General” M.D. Skobelev, who brilliantly showed himself in this battle, was outraged: “ Napoleon rejoiced if any of the marshals won him half an hour of time. I won them the whole day - and they didn’t use it ”.

Having lost up to 16 thousand soldiers and officers (13 thousand Russians and 3 thousand Romanians) during the last most fierce assault, the Russian command decided to proceed with the blockade of the city.

Meanwhile, the army of Osman Pasha received new reinforcements and provisions, and the marshal himself received the title of "Gazi" (invincible) from the Sultan for his successes. However, successful Russian operations near Gorny Dubnyak and Telish led to a complete blockade of Plevna. The Russian-Romanian army besieging Plevna numbered 122 thousand people against almost 50 thousand Turks who had taken refuge in the city. Constant artillery fire, depletion of provisions and the onset of illness led to a significant weakening of the Turkish garrison. Cramped in Plevna by an iron ring of Russian troops four times superior to it, the army of Osman Pasha began to suffocate in this vice. However, the Turkish commander answered all proposals to surrender with a decisive refusal. Knowing the iron character of the "invincible" Osman Pasha, it was clear that under the circumstances he would make a last attempt to break through the besieging army.

In the early morning of November 28, taking advantage of the fog, the beleaguered Turkish army attacked the Russian troops. Having taken the advanced fortifications thanks to an unexpected and furious blow, the army of Osman Pasha was stopped by artillery fire from the second line of fortifications. And after the attack of the Russian-Romanian troops in all directions and the capture by Skobelev of Plevna itself, abandoned by the Turks, Osman Pasha's position became hopeless. Seriously wounded in the leg, the Turkish commander realized the hopelessness of his situation and suspended the battle, ordering the white flag to be thrown out. The Turkish army surrendered unconditionally. During the last battle, Russian-Romanian losses amounted to about 1,700 people, and Turkish - about 6,000. The remaining 43.5 thousand Turkish soldiers and officers, including the army commander, were taken prisoner. However, highly appreciating the courage shown by Osman Pasha, Emperor Alexander II ordered that the marshal's honors be returned to the wounded and captured Turkish commander and that the saber be returned to him.

In just four months of the siege and fighting near Plevna, about 31 thousand Russian soldiers died. But the capture of Plevna was a turning point in the war, allowing the Russian command to release over 100 thousand people for the offensive, after which the Russian army occupied Andrianopol without a fight and approached Constantinople.

In 1887, on the tenth anniversary of the capture of Plevna, a monument to Russian grenadiers who distinguished themselves in this battle was unveiled in Moscow. The monument was designed by architect V.O. A chapel-monument was built on the initiative and on the voluntary donations of the surviving grenadiers - participants in the Plevna battle. At the opening of the monument, as a warning to posterity, the senior adjutant of the headquarters of the grenadier corps, Lieutenant Colonel I.Ya. Sokol, said the following important words: “Let this monument, erected by grateful grenadiers to their fallen comrades, remind future generations from year to year, from century to century, how her faithful sons are able to stand up for the honor and glory of the Motherland, when they are inspired by the holy Orthodox faith, boundless love for the Tsar and Fatherland!”.

During the years of Soviet power, the Plevna Chapel miraculously survived, but at the same time it fell into a dilapidated state. Only in December 1993, the Government of Moscow handed over the chapel-monument to the Russian Orthodox Church, which, by decree of Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow and All Russia, in 1999 acquired the status of the Patriarchal Metochion. And from now on, every year at the chapel-monument, traditional events are held in memory of the Russian heroes - the liberators of Bulgaria.

Prepared Andrey Ivanov, Doctor of Historical Sciences